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I. Introduction 
 
It has been some time since the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation has undertaken a study of the natural gas industry in New Zealand, so it seemed to 
be a good idea to take a fresh look at the industry.  The authors found the state of the industry 
to be much more interesting than they anticipated.  It also turned out that this is an opportune 
time for such a study, as the two industry regulators are undertaking regulatory initiatives.  
The Commerce Commission is in the midst of setting their default price-quality regulatory 
framework that will take effect in July 2012.
1
  The Gas Industry Company, the industry co-
regulator, has just recently issued a proposal to undertake a project to determine the current 
need for gas transmission investment and to develop a way for any needed investment to 
occur.
2
   
 
The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is also undertaking policy initiatives that 
directly affect the gas industry. In recent years, uncertainty as to the future supply of gas has 
been targeted by the MED with the introduction of exploration incentives, including reduced 
royalty and tax rates on gas producers.
3
 The authors are hopeful that this study will prove 
useful to industry participants, policy makers and also to the two industry regulators. 
 
The gas industry in New Zealand today has had competition introduced into all segments of 
the industry except, in most cases, pipelines.  Production, wholesaling, retailing, and even 
meters are competitive.  This is impressive on an international comparison basis, and no 
doubt New Zealanders are reaping the benefits.  While Nova Energy provides some 
competition to other pipeline distribution systems, pipeline transmission companies, Maui and 
Vector, and other pipeline distribution companies, are regulated as monopolies.  The policy 
issues mostly, but not entirely, revolve around this regulated segment of the industry. 
 
The system of co-regulation, with the Commerce Commission and the Gas Industry Company 
sharing regulatory oversight of the industry, is unique to New Zealand.  It does, however, 
seem to be working.  While there might be some fear that the Gas Industry Company becomes 
a trade association rather than a regulator, this does not seem to be the case and there does not 
appear to be any cause for concern along these lines. 
                                               
1  Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 1.2. 
2  Gas Industry Company, “Proposed Gas Transmission Investment Project”, Document number 
170803.8, 25 May 2011. 
3
 Ministry of Economic Development, “Minerals Programme for Petroleum”, 1 January 2005. 
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In preparation for this study, the authors reviewed the available public information about the 
New Zealand gas industry.  They also met with government officials, regulators, and industry 
participants at all stages of production, including producers, pipeline companies, distribution 
companies, and retailers.  The authors were also able to talk with others in New Zealand 
knowledgeable about the gas industry.  While all of these discussions remain confidential, the 
information and understanding gained from these meetings has provided useful background 
information for the preparation of the report. 
 
The second section of the report provides an overview of the gas industry today along with 
some forecasts of production and demand.  Section II of the report contains various tables, 
figures, and maps that provide a description of the important aspects of the industry.  The 
third section of the report provides analysis of the major policy issues confronting the 
industry and makes a number of policy recommendations.  The last section of the report 
provides a summary of these policy recommendations.  
3 
 
II. Overview of the Gas Industry in New Zealand 
 
This section of the report analyses the structure of the gas industry in New Zealand. First, a 
summary of the stages of production is presented along with the major market participants at 
each stage. Second, the determinants of supply and demand are outlined, and projections of 
future gas production and prices are discussed. Finally, transmission and distribution pipeline 
networks are described along with major pipeline owners and regulatory changes to pipeline 
businesses. 
 
Industry Overview 
 
The path from the gas field to the final consumer is relatively direct. Treated near the field, 
gas is then transmitted through pressurised pipelines to cities, gas fired electricity generators 
and major industrial users. Within cities and towns, low pressure distribution pipelines carry 
gas to industrial, commercial and residential consumers. The stages of production, along with 
major market participants, are shown in Table 1.  Gas transmission and distribution pipeline 
businesses (excluding Nova Gas) are regulated as monopolies and are currently subject to 
price caps.  Price-quality path regulation is currently being developed by the Commerce 
Commission and is due to take effect on 1 July 2012.
4
 Transmission and distribution pipeline 
businesses are the only parts of the industry that are subject to price regulation. 
 
The gas industry in New Zealand is relatively decentralised, with growing competition in both 
upstream and downstream segments of the industry and few companies that are vertically 
integrated. The only three companies with significant vertical integration are Todd Energy, 
Vector and Greymouth Gas.  Todd Energy operates as a producer, and through their 
subsidiary Nova Gas they also have distribution and retail businesses. Nova Gas’ distribution 
network was built in order to bypass incumbent distribution networks and is not currently 
required by regulation to provide access to competing retailers.  Vector operates both high 
pressure transmission pipelines and low pressure distribution networks. They also buy and 
sell wholesale gas through their brand OnGas. Vector has no production capacity, and OnGas 
sells gas only to large commercial and industrial customers. Vector’s transmission pipelines 
and distribution networks are subject to regulation which requires them to provide network 
                                               
4 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 1.2. 
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access to competitors at regulated prices.  Greymouth Gas is both a gas producer and retailer, 
with approximately 5 percent of production and a 5.5 percent retail share in 2009.
5
 
 
Contact Energy is a large user of gas, with gas fired power stations at Stratford in the 
Taranaki region and Otahuhu in Auckland.
6
 Currently, Contact Energy has no production 
assets. Australian energy company Origin Energy owns 51 percent of Contact, and they do 
hold a number of petroleum exploration permits in New Zealand, including a 50 percent share 
in the Kupe field.
7
 The Kupe field contains approximately 13 percent of New Zealand’s P508 
gas reserves. In response to their inflexible take-or-pay contracts for gas from the Pohokura 
field, Contact Energy has also developed a gas storage facility at Ahuroa, Taranaki. This will 
allow Contact to store excess gas for use when prices are high or when they have high 
requirements for gas-fired electricity generation. 
  
                                               
5
 See Table 1: Gas Industry Overview. 
6 See Map 4: Major Transmission Pipelines and Large Gas Fired Power Stations. 
7 Source: http://www.originenergy.com.au/1864/New-Zealand and http://www.nzog.net/kupe. Both 
accessed June 2011. 
8 Ministry of Economic Development Energy Data File 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____43905.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
P50 reserves are defined as the median estimate of reserves that are economic to produce at current 
prices with existing technology. P50 is also sometimes referred to as Proved plus Probable, or 2P. 
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Table 1: Gas Industry Overview
9
 
Fields (2009 net 
production, share 
of total) 
McKee  
(6.44 PJ, 
4.0%) 
Mangahewa 
(5.72 PJ, 
3.6%) 
Maui  
(52.81 PJ, 
33.2%) 
Kapuni 
(15.29 PJ, 
9.6%) 
Turangi  
(7.62 PJ, 
4.8%) 
Pohokura 
(68.82 PJ, 
43.3%) 
Others  
(2.32 PJ, 1.5%) 
Major 
Shareholders 
(Percentage 
shareholding) 
Todd Energy (100%) Shell 
(83.75%) 
OMV (10%) 
Todd Energy 
(6.25%) 
Shell (50%) 
Todd Energy 
(50%) 
Greymouth 
Gas (100%) 
Shell (48%) 
Todd Energy 
(26%) 
OMV (26%) 
 
      
Producers (2009 
net production, 
share of total)
10
 
Shell  
(85 PJ, 53%) 
Todd  
(41 PJ, 26%) 
OMV  
(23 PJ, 14%) 
Greymouth Gas 
(8 PJ, 5%) 
Others  
(2 PJ, 1%) 
      
Wholesalers Vector The Crown Todd Energy Contact Energy Greymouth Gas 
   
Pipeline 
Transmission 
Companies (high 
pressure) 
Vector Maui Development 
     
Pipeline 
Distribution 
Companies (low 
pressure) 
Powerco Nova Energy Vector Gasnet 
        
Retailers (2009 
retail amounts 
and shares of 
total)
10 
Contact 
 (47.4 PJ, 
32.3%) 
Genesis 
 (32.5 PJ, 
22.1%) 
Maui 
Development 
(26.9 PJ, 
18.3%) 
Vector  
(15.9 PJ, 
10.8%) 
Nova Energy 
(6.1 PJ, 
4.2%) 
Greymouth 
Gas  
(8.1 PJ, 
5.5%) 
Others
11
  
(9.9 PJ, 6.7%) 
      
Major Uses Electricity 
generation 
(excluding 
cogeneration) 
Ammonia/urea 
manufacture 
Chemical methanol 
manufacture 
Major users 
supplied directly 
from transmission 
system 
Users supplied from 
distribution systems 
Demand (2009 
demand, share of 
total) 
(53.7 PJ, 35%) (24.5 PJ, 16%) (77.1 PJ, 50%) 
Consumers Contact Energy 
Genesis Energy 
Mighty River 
Power 
Ballance Agri-
Nutrients (Kapuni) 
Limited 
Methanex New Zealand Steel 
Carter Holt Harvey 
Degussa Peroxide 
Fonterra Co-op 
Todd Energy/ 
Kiwi Cogeneration 
NZ Refinery Co 
Southdown Co-
generation 
Tasman Pulp and 
Paper 
Other Industry 
Commercial 
Residential 
Transport (as CNG) 
  
                                               
9
 Source: All data except where specified are taken from the Ministry of Economic Development 
Energy Data File 2010. This is available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____43905.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
10 Source: Discussions with the Ministry of Economic Development. 
11 Includes Mercury Energy, Energy Direct and E-Gas. Note that E-gas has subsequently gone into 
liquidation and their customer database was purchased by Todd Energy’s retail subsidiary, Nova Gas, 
in November 2010 (National Business Review, “Nova wins bid for E-Gas customers”, 26 November 
2010, http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/nova-wins-bid-e-gas-customers-133889. Accessed June 2011). 
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Exploration and Production 
 
Currently, all gas production in New Zealand is in the Taranaki basin. Early stage exploration 
is currently underway in the Canterbury, Great South, Northland, Deepwater Taranaki and 
Raukumara basins. The MED’s Energy Outlook 2010 Reference Scenario predicts that by 
2030 around one third of New Zealand’s gas production will come from these frontier 
basins.
12
 Coal seam gas prospects are also being considered for development in the Waikato, 
Southland and West Coast regions.
13
 Map 1 shows the sedimentary basins of New Zealand, 
which have the potential for petroleum deposits. 
  
                                               
12 Ministry of Economic Development, Technical Guide: Energy Outlook Modelling, Version 1.1, 
March 2011. Available at: http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/76133/Technical%20Guide%20v1.1.pdf. 
Accessed May 2011. 
13 Ministry of Economic Development, Crown Minerals: New Zealand Petroleum Basins, 2010. 
Available at: http://www.nzpam.govt.nz/cms/pdf-library/petroleum-publications-
1/2010%20NZ%20Petroleum%20Basin%20Report-WEB.pdf. Accessed June 2011. 
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Map 1: The Sedimentary Basins of New Zealand
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
14 This map provides a general indication of the primary sedimentary basins of New Zealand, which 
have the potential for petroleum deposits. Source: Crown Minerals, “Minerals Programme for 
Production”, 1 January 2005. Available at http://www.nzpam.govt.nz/cms/pdf-library/petroleum-
publications-1/mins-prog-for-petroleum-2005.pdf. Accessed May 2011. 
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Within the Taranaki basin, the Maui field has historically provided most of New Zealand’s 
gas supply. As reserves and production at the Maui field have declined, a range of new fields, 
particularly Pohokura, have been developed in the region, offsetting much of the fall in Maui 
production. Figure 1 shows historical net gas production by field. 
 
Figure 1: Net Gas Production by Field (PJ)
 15
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 displays recent estimates of P50
16
 gas field reserves in Taranaki compared with real 
average wholesale gas prices. As the prices on the graph are averages, they can diverge from 
the marginal price of gas in the period. Energy consultants and forecasting company Energy 
Link estimate a medium term contract rate for gas of around $6 per GJ for April 2011. The 
average wholesale prices reported by MED are influenced by long term contracts and also do 
not distinguish between flexible and inflexible contracts. Therefore, the average price 
reported by MED can diverge from the current market price for gas. 
 
Changes in wholesale gas prices affect reserves through the definition of P50 reserves and by 
increasing producers’ incentives to verify them. First, P50 reserves are defined as resources 
                                               
15 Ministry of Economic Development Energy Data File 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____43905.aspx Accessed May 2011. 
16 P50 reserves are the median estimate of reserves that are economic to produce at current prices with 
existing technology.  P50 is also sometimes referred to as Proved plus Probable, or 2P. 
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with a probability of production of 50 percent or higher at current prices. Following an 
increase in the price of gas, a greater amount of known reserves become economic to produce 
and so are captured under the definition of P50 reserves. Second, reserves are costly to verify 
and require a significant investment on behalf of the producer. For this reason, producers 
prefer to push back exploration until they believe that it will be profitable to produce from 
these resources. 
 
Prior to 2003, the Maui gas field sold all of its gas to the Crown at a price determined by a 
legacy contract. The Crown then sold this gas to users including electricity generators and 
retailers. This is indicated in Figure 2 by the near constant real wholesale gas prices between 
1996 and 2002. The price paid by the Crown was below what would have prevailed as a 
market price, and consequently P50 reserves at the Maui field were depleting rapidly and new 
discoveries were not occurring. 
 
In 2003, the Maui supply contract was re-determined. A portion of the gas was removed from 
the supply agreement and allowed to be sold at market prices. As shown in Figure 2, the 
prevailing market prices for gas after 2003 were considerably higher than the price under the 
legacy contract.  With the increase in wholesale prices following the Maui re-determination, 
producers undertook significantly more investment in exploration and development of 
reserves. Subsequently, proven reserves have increased significantly with large new 
discoveries including the Pohokura field. Figure 2 also shows that reserves as measured by 
implied years of supply have rebounded and have tended towards an equilibrium level of 
around 14 years. 
 
Since 2005, government incentives have been introduced in order to encourage exploration. 
These incentives include reduced royalty rates for oil and gas producers.
17
  To date, the 
success of these incentives is questionable, with high rates of exploration but no large new 
discoveries. 
 
 
                                               
17
 Ministry of Economic Development, “Minerals Programme for Petroleum”, 1 January 2005. 
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Figure 2: P50
18
 Reserves (PJ, Left Hand Scale), Real Wholesale Gas Price (2009 Dollars 
per GJ, Right Hand Scale) and Implied Years of Supply (Lower Panel)
 19
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows gas reinjection rates as a share of gross production. Gas is normally drawn 
from wells in constant rates but can be re-injected back into the well in order to manage 
supply to meet demand or to increase the pressure in the well. Increasing the pressure in the 
well through gas reinjection can in some cases increase the flow of oil. 
 
Installing gas reinjection at a field can require a large initial investment, and in many cases 
reinjection can decrease the potential future production of the field. According to industry 
participants, early purchase agreements for gas at the Maui field included options to take a 
variable supply from the field. This required the field to be extremely flexible and run high 
levels of gas reinjection. Decreases in reinjection would increase net supply if the demand for 
gas increased. This high use of reinjection decreased the life of the Maui field, and as reserves 
declined, reinjection was decreased and purchase agreements became less flexible. 
                                               
18 P50 reserves are the median estimate of reserves that are economic to produce at current prices with 
existing technology.  P50 is also sometimes referred to as Proved plus Probable, or 2P. 
19 Sources: MED Energy Data File (1997-2010), MED Energy Outlook 2010. The MED Energy Data 
Files are available at http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____15169.aspx. The MED 
Energy Outlook 2010 is available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx. Both websites accessed 
May 2011. 
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In recent years, gas reinjection rates have started to increase. This is indicative of excess gas 
supply, which would increase the incentives for producers to retain the gas for future sale and 
also increase the use of gas to increase pressure in oil rich wells. 
 
 
Figure 3: New Zealand Gas Reinjection as a Share of Gross Production20 
 
 
  
                                               
20 Ministry of Economic Development Energy Data File 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____43905.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
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Demand 
 
Figure 4 displays real average gas prices as reported by the MED. The prices reported are 
averaged over users and time and over fixed and variable costs. The average prices shown are 
inclusive of transmission and distribution costs, which vary geographically.
21
 
 
Demand for gas is seasonal in New Zealand, due largely to demand from electricity 
generators. Electricity generation accounts for approximately 35 percent of annual gas 
demand.
22
 Geothermal electricity generation has high initial costs but extremely low marginal 
costs. Geothermal plants are therefore generally operated at full capacity and provide a stable 
base load output. Other renewable forms of electricity generation including solar and wind 
power are more intermittent, providing a variable supply. Hydroelectric generation can be 
used for flexible generation, but its capacity is greatly reduced in years of low rainfall. 
Hydroelectric generation accounted for approximately 61 percent of national electricity 
generation in 2009.
23
 Gas fired electricity generation can be flexible and is suitable for 
offsetting intermittent wind powered generation, as well as for base load capacity in dry years 
when lake levels are low. 
 
The lack of reinjection facilities at the Pohokura gas field has reduced the flexibility of the 
gas supply in New Zealand in recent years. Retailers and electricity generators have only been 
able to secure take-or-pay contracts for gas, where they must pay for the full contracted 
amount of gas whether they use it or not. This inflexibility of gas supply contracts has 
prevented electricity generators from effectively utilising the flexible nature of gas fired 
power stations. Contact Energy’s recent investment in gas storage at Ahuroa, and producers’ 
investments in reinjection technology at other newly developed gas fields, should allow 
flexible supply that will encourage efficient use of gas fired electricity generation. 
 
  
                                               
21 For residential customers, calculating an average price for gas is particularly difficult. This is 
because many residential gas customers purchase both gas and electricity from the same retailer, which 
can lead to cross-subsidisation. Also, residential contracts often contain both fixed costs and costs 
dependent on usage. Determining an average price from these contracts can be difficult. Discussions 
with industry participants suggest that the recent volatility in reported residential retail prices is not 
likely to be representative of actual market conditions but rather may be caused by difficulties in 
aggregating and averaging prices. 
22 See Table 1: Gas Industry Overview. 
23 Source: Ministry of Economic Development Energy Outlook 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx.  Accessed May 2011. 
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Demand for gas for industrial and commercial use follows different patterns than for 
electricity generation. Users with highly variable consumption patterns include Methanex, 
whose demand is based largely on international methanol prices and the foreign exchange 
rate; and Fonterra, who have significant demand throughout most of the year, dropping for a 
short period towards the end of winter. 
 
In the future, demand for gas will be largely dependent on developments in the electricity 
sector. Energy Link find that increasing base load gas fired generation is becoming 
uneconomic compared to renewable generation, but that increased inflexible geothermal and 
intermittent wind electricity generation will increase the need for highly flexible gas fired 
power stations that can be used both for short term peaking and for dry year generation. 
 
Figure 4: Real Average Gas Prices (2009 Dollars per GJ) 24 
 
  
                                               
24 Ministry of Economic Development Energy Data File 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____43905.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
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Projections 
 
This report makes use of forecasts from the MED Energy Outlook 2010, Reference Scenario
25
 
(referred to from here on as the Reference Scenario). The MED Energy Outlook was designed 
primarily for modelling electricity prices; however, it contains a simulation of gas production, 
demand and prices, which are critical determinants of electricity generation in New Zealand. 
The Reference Scenario includes a carbon price of 50 2009 NZ dollars per tonne. 
 
The Reference Scenario forecasts an increasing role for wind and geothermal electricity 
generation in New Zealand. Geothermal generation’s low marginal costs make it suitable for 
stable base load generation.  Wind powered generation is intermittent even in high quality 
locations. In order to match supply and demand, this inflexible and intermittent generation 
must be offset by flexible generation, such as hydro or gas fired peaking plants. The 
Reference Scenario forecasts an increase in hydroelectric capacity of 1,500MW by 2030 and 
an increase in gas peaking capacity over the same period of 460MW. Figure 5 shows recent 
trends and Reference Scenario projections of electricity generation by fuel. 
 
The Reference Scenario forecasts that the dual gas and coal fuelled generating units at Huntly 
will all be decommissioned by 2030 and that the remaining gas fired base load plants at 
Stratford and Otahuhu will be decommissioned in 2025 and 2030 respectively. From this 
point, the use of gas will decline as reserves in Taranaki become depleted and New Zealand 
must rely on more expensive gas from frontier basins, including Canterbury, Great Southern, 
Northland, Deepwater Taranaki and Raukumara basins. The Reference Scenario predicts that 
by 2030 around one third of total gas production could come from these frontier basins.
26
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
25 Reference Scenario including a carbon price of $50 per tonne, Ministry of Economic Development 
Energy Outlook 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
26 Ministry of Economic Development Technical Guide: Energy Outlook Modelling, Version 1.1, 
March 2011. Available at: http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/76133/Technical%20Guide%20v1.1.pdf. 
Accessed May 2011. 
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Figure 5: New Zealand Annual Electricity Production by Fuel (GWh)
27
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the Reference Scenario forecast for real wholesale gas prices in 2009 dollars. 
The large increase in prices in 2003 follows the redetermination of the Maui gas field, which 
introduced market prices for wholesale gas in New Zealand. The increase in prices in 2013 is 
due to the introduction of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The Reference 
Scenario is based on a carbon price of 50 2009 dollars per tonne. 
 
The real wholesale gas price is forecast to remain constant in the Reference Scenario until 
2030. From 2030 onwards, frontier basins including the Canterbury, Great Southern, 
Northland, Deepwater Taranaki and Raukumara basins become a major source of gas supply, 
contributing around 30 percent of national production. These supplies are predicted to have 
higher break even costs of production than fields in the Taranaki region, and this higher cost 
of production leads to an increase in real gas prices from $9.92 to $13.64 from 2029 to 2032. 
 
  
                                               
27 Ministry of Economic Development Energy Outlook 2010.  Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
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Energy Link also considers that frontier basins have the potential for large discoveries but that 
these basins are likely to have low to medium probabilities of drilling success. There is, 
therefore, considerable uncertainty over the economics of these basins and whether they can 
provide a substantial share of New Zealand’s gas supply. In absence of significant discoveries 
in frontier basins, Energy Link sees the probability of imported LNG increasing at a moderate 
rate from 2020. 
 
 
Figure 6: Wholesale Gas Average Real Prices (2009 Dollars per GJ)
 28
 
 
 
 
As gas reserves declined in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Huntly power station which can 
operate with a mix of gas and coal fuel, increased its coal share relative to gas. Methanex also 
decreased their use of gas in manufacturing methanol. The resulting decrease in annual gas 
production from 2000 is seen clearly in Figure 7. As shown, the Reference Scenario predicts 
gas production to rise in the medium term, before declining from 2025 onwards as fields in 
the Taranaki basin are depleted. 
                                               
28 Reference Scenario including carbon price of $50 per tonne, Ministry of Economic Development 
Energy Outlook 2010.  Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
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Figure 7: Annual Gas Production (PJ)
 29
 
 
 
 
A number of industry participants expressed concern over the certainty of future gas supplies. 
Producers, however, were confident that New Zealand is under explored and that supply 
concerns are misplaced. Recent increases in gas reinjection and the operation of Methanex 
facilities in converting gas to methanol suggest that surplus gas is currently available. 
Exploration is likely to increase as reserves in existing fields are depleted and to decrease 
following significant discoveries. 
  
                                               
29Reference Scenario including carbon price of $50 per tonne, Ministry of Economic Development 
Energy Outlook 2010. Available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____45552.aspx. Accessed May 2011. 
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Transmission 
 
Map 2 shows the high pressure gas transmission networks in New Zealand. Gas produced in 
the Taranaki region is delivered throughout the North Island through these networks. Most 
areas in the North Island are served by these networks, with the notable exception of the 
Wairarapa region. There is currently no transmission of gas from the North Island to the 
South Island and no production of gas in the South Island. 
 
Much of the existing gas pipeline and distribution networks were built in the 1970s by the 
then state-owned Natural Gas Corporation. Natural Gas Corporation was privatised in 1988 
with the sale of parent company Petrocorp to Fletcher Challenge Ltd.
30
 These pipeline 
businesses remained unregulated, but in 2004 the Commerce Commission determined that 
pipeline and distribution businesses were earning excess profits.
31
 Price controls for gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines were subsequently ordered in 2005.
32
 The Commerce 
Commission intends to set their initial default price-quality path in July 2012.
33
 Both the 
Vector and Maui pipelines are subject to proposed price quality regulation from the 
Commerce Commission. 
 
The Maui pipeline is a large pipeline that generally operates with large amounts of spare 
capacity. Demand for transmission capacity on the Maui pipeline is volatile. This is because 
some large users including the Huntly power station have variable demand dependent on gas 
and electricity prices. The Maui pipeline can accommodate this variable demand by varying 
the pressure and, consequently, the amount of gas in the pipeline. This also permits the Maui 
pipeline to provide a balancing function for the entire gas transmission system, including the 
Vector system to which it is connected, when supply and demand on the system are not equal.   
 
Users on the Maui Pipeline operate on short term contracts. The relatively low utilisation of 
the pipeline means that there is an insignificant risk of lack of availability for users.  They are, 
therefore, willing to contract on a short term basis. 
 
  
                                               
30 Reuters, “COMPANY NEWS; New Zealand Deal”, 4 March 1988. 
31 Commerce Commission, Gas Control Inquiry: Final Report, Public Version, 29 November 2004. 
32 New Zealand Government, “Commerce (Control of Natural Gas Services) Order 2005”, Order in 
Council, 25 July 2005. 
33 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 1.2. 
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The Vector pipeline network consists of smaller pipelines that are connected to the Maui 
pipeline at various points and that carry gas to large industrial users and distribution networks. 
In the case of users not meeting their booked capacity, overruns (or under-runs) are balanced 
by Vector with the Maui pipeline, and any costs are then passed through to Vector’s 
customers. 
 
The gas fired power stations at Otahuhu and Southdown in Auckland hold long term contracts 
for transmission capacity on the Vector pipeline. In addition, retailers hold one-year capacity 
contracts. These contracts are negotiated bilaterally but are subject to the Vector Transmission 
Code, which affords users the option to renew their contracts when they expire. The right to 
renew transmission contracts effectively gives users perpetual rights on the Vector pipeline.  
 
Although gas use is lower now than it was in 2000, this decline has been mostly due to the 
increase of coal used to fuel the Huntly power station and a reduction in the use of gas for 
methanol manufacture in Taranaki. These two large users are connected directly to the Maui 
pipeline. Some of this decline in demand by these large users has been offset by new 
industrial users located around and north of Auckland. These users are dependent on the 
Vector pipeline network. Vector has recently announced that sections of their pipeline 
network have become fully booked. Retailers relying on the Vector pipeline system are able 
to supply new small customers, but they are unable to supply new large industrial or 
commercial customers. 
 
There is some suggestion amongst industry participants that retailers are holding excess 
capacity on the Vector pipeline, that the physical capacity limit on the pipeline has not been 
reached and that the pipeline is not being used efficiently. Some shippers may hold excess 
capacity in their role as electricity generators in order to have access to transmission capacity 
in dry years for increased gas-fired electricity generation.  Other shippers may be reluctant to 
give up any excess capacity because of the threat of not being able to secure additional 
capacity in the future when it is needed.   
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Map 2: Major Transmission Pipelines
34
 
 
 
 
Map 3 shows the northern part of the North Island. The Maui high pressure transmission 
pipeline carries gas as far north as the Huntly power station, which can be fuelled by either 
coal or gas. North of Huntly, the Vector high pressure transmission pipeline carries gas 
through Auckland to Whangarei. Major gas users on the Vector transmission pipeline in this 
area include NZ Steel at Glenbrook, the Otahuhu and Southdown gas fired power stations, 
Fonterra at Kauri and Maungaturoto and the Marsden Point Refinery. 
 
                                               
34 Locations of transmission pipelines are based on discussions with MED and industry participants. 
The map is designed for indicative purposes only. 
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The section of the transmission pipeline from Papakura to Henderson (shown in green on 
Map 3) was designed to operate at a lower pressure than other sections of Vector’s 
transmission network. This section is currently capacity constrained, and an upgrade of 
capacity large enough to support further industrial or electricity generation use would require 
a by-pass pipeline to be built alongside some sections of the current pipeline. This investment 
would be large, and although current capacity is constrained, it is unlikely that a significant 
share of the new capacity resulting from the investment could be absorbed by current demand 
without a new large user such as the proposed Otahuhu C or Rodney gas fired power stations. 
 
 
 
 
Map 3: Northern New Zealand Transmission Pipelines
35
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35 Locations of transmission pipelines and pressure ratings of pipelines are based on discussions with 
MED and industry participants. The map is designed for indicative purposes only. 
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Map 4 shows the major high pressure transmission pipelines in New Zealand, and the large 
gas fired power stations with capacity over 100MW. Also indicated are proposed power 
stations at Otahuhu and Rodney. 
 
 
Map 4: Major Transmission Pipelines and Large Gas Fired Power Stations
36
 
 
  
                                               
36 Locations of power stations and transmission pipelines are based on discussions with MED and 
industry participants. The map is designed for indicative purposes only. 
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It is costly to transport both gas and electricity, so the location of new gas fired power plants 
will be based on the tradeoff between having production either local to demand or local to the 
supply of gas, as well as a consideration of transport capacity both on the pipeline network 
and on the electricity transmission grid.  Current capacity shortages on the Vector pipeline 
system suggest that new gas fired electricity generation plants are likely to be built mainly in 
the Taranaki region, close to the gas fields. This trend is also supported by recent increases in 
investment in the electricity transmission grid throughout New Zealand. 
 
Map 5 shows the high pressure gas transmission pipelines in New Zealand and also indicates 
the regions served by different low pressure gas distribution companies. Vector and Powerco 
operate the largest distribution networks and along with Gasnet are subject to proposed price 
quality regulation by the Commerce Commission. Nova Gas operates distribution networks in 
Auckland, New Plymouth and Wellington. These networks were built as by pass networks in 
order to compete with incumbent distribution companies. Nova Gas’ distribution network is 
not subject to the Commerce Commission’s proposed price quality regulation, nor is it subject 
to the open access requirement. 
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Map 5: Transmission Pipelines and Distribution Networks
37
 
 
 
  
                                               
37 Locations of transmission pipelines and distribution networks are based on discussions with MED 
and industry participants. The map is designed for indicative purposes only. 
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III. Analysis and Policy Issues for the Gas Industry in New 
Zealand 
 
Studying the gas industry in New Zealand leads to several areas where policy 
recommendations are in order.  This section of the report provides some analysis in each of 
these areas and offers policy recommendations where appropriate.  The topic that all industry 
participants are currently talking about is the issue of the Vector pipeline system, whether or 
not there is an actual capacity constraint, and, if so, how the problem can be solved.  There 
are, however, additional important policy considerations, including those centred on 
regulation and privatisation.   
 
Information 
 
There does not seem to be consistency across parties in the gas industry as to basic industry 
data.  For example, producers say plenty of gas is available, and plenty of reserves, and the 
low cost gas permitting the Methanex plant to operate is consistent with this position.  Todd 
Energy’s McKee field is only producing at around 25% of capacity, for example.  Producers 
also argue that reserves will not be proven too far in advance because of the cost, but they 
seem confident that reserves are available and point out that the geology around New Zealand 
is favourable to gas.  Supporting this position is the fact that the Taranaki area and other areas 
around New Zealand are relatively under-explored by global standards.   
 
There has been substantial exploration around New Zealand in response to government 
incentives, but so far there has not been much drilling and there have been no new gas 
discoveries.  Nonetheless, producers are confident that gas would be available if demand 
increased or reserves were depleted.  At this time, however, producers seem more concerned 
about a large gas discovery that could not be absorbed by the New Zealand market rather than 
any shortage of gas.  The Ministry of Economic Development should consider its total 
package of gas exploration incentives at such time as the Ministry determines that 
finding new gas reserves is a priority. 
 
There is some evidence to support the position of the producers.  For example, Figure 1 
shows that gas production remains high, with the drop since 2000 mostly accounted for by the 
increase in the share of coal relative to gas used to fuel the Huntly power station and cutbacks 
at the Methanex facility.  Figure 2 shows that while wholesale prices have risen, reserves have 
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recovered.  Even more clearly, the figure shows that the years of supply available from 
reserves is at normal levels, between 12 and 16 years.  Because of the cost of proving 
reserves, years of supply cannot be expected to be greater than this.  Figure 2 also shows that 
when reserves dropped, and the years of supply dropped below ten, additional gas was 
forthcoming, as producers argue would happen again.  Furthermore, increasing gas reinjection 
rates as shown in Figure 3 are an additional indication of ample gas supplies. 
 
Retailers, however, seem uncertain as to the availability of supplies, especially in the longer 
term, and retailers and customers seem reluctant to make plans that depend on additional 
long-term supplies of gas.  Retailers are also uncertain as to the availability of transmission 
capacity on Vector’s system.  Some parties expect Vector to build capacity in response to 
demand, but Vector says that the demand for new capacity is unclear and that current 
regulatory rules make it too risky to undertake new pipeline investment.  In contrast, other 
parties suggest that Vector is simply not willing to accept normal business risk and expect 
Vector to do so in the face of demonstrated demand.   
 
There does not seem to be a consistent view across parties of supply and demand conditions 
in the industry.  The Gas Industry Company could facilitate the communication of 
information to all parties, including industry supply conditions and pipeline capacity 
availability.  Information could be tested by all parties, and as a result everyone would have a 
more consistent view of the state of the industry and of the short and longer-term supply and 
demand conditions.   
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Vector Pipeline Capacity Constraint 
 
Short Term 
 
There may or may not be a capacity constraint on the Vector pipeline, but in the short term it 
seems to be large customers who are harmed by the current situation.  It is clear that the 
pipeline is essentially full.  Vector is unable to implement any additional low-cost fixes to get 
small increments of available capacity (these were exhausted in 2009).  The threat of a 
capacity shortage has caused shippers to hang on to any excess capacity they have, and the 
grandfathered shipping rights that certain shippers have has made the problem worse.  The 
cost of holding excess capacity is not great, as in total gas transmission charges are only about 
10% of the average total retail cost of gas (holding 10% excess capacity would only cost 1% 
of the total cost of gas, for example).  If anyone gains from this situation, it will be retailers 
who have essentially captive large customers, perhaps giving the retailers some market 
power, permitting them to capture some economic rents. 
 
The use of Vector’s pipeline may not be fully optimised, as there seems to be some excess 
capacity under Vector’s contract carriage regime at most or all times.  This amount of excess 
capacity is small, however, and shippers may want to hold some excess capacity in any case.  
A switch to a common carriage regime, as is sometimes suggested, will not make any 
additional capacity available, and it is not clear that it would reduce the incentive for shippers 
to hold excess capacity if there was still a fear of a transmission capacity shortage.  Similarly, 
ending the grandfathered rights of some shippers, which would involve breaking contracts, 
will not make any additional capacity available, or at least not much, if there is still an 
incentive to hold whatever excess capacity may exist. 
 
While customers may move from one retailer to another, this does not increase the total 
demand for pipeline transmission capacity.  Large customers are, however, unable to do this 
at the current time because retailers are unable to procure shipping capacity to serve new large 
customers. 
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The decline in overall use of gas
38
 was due to the decrease in gas used at the Huntly power 
station, but the Huntly plant is connected directly to the Maui pipeline and so did not have 
any effect on Vector’s capacity constraint.  Similarly, the Methanex plant contributed to the 
overall decline in gas use, but it is also not connected to the Vector pipeline system. 
 
At the same time, there does not seem to be new shippers or existing shippers who are 
actually willing to pay for new pipeline capacity.  This may be partly because of uncertainty 
over the availability of gas in the medium to long term.  It is for this reason, though, that it is 
unclear if there is actually a capacity problem on Vector’s pipeline. 
 
It is the large customers who are harmed by the real or imagined transmission shortage.  
Because residential customers make up such a small portion of the total demand for gas, and 
because individual residential (or small commercial and industrial) customers are so small, 
they are able to change retailers without problem.  Retailers cannot, however, solicit large 
commercial or industrial customers who are served from Vector’s pipeline system as they do 
not have the spare transmission capacity available on Vector’s pipeline that would be needed 
to serve such a customer.  Any available spare capacity is apparently small, and is not 
necessarily available at all times, and is therefore insufficient to supply such a customer.  This 
is the case even though a large customer changing retailers would not increase the total 
demand for transmission capacity on Vector’s pipeline. 
 
A short-term solution to the Vector pipeline capacity problem is to let large customers 
(this would need to be defined) take their Vector transmission capacity with them when 
they switch retailers.
39
  While this does take some property rights to Vector transmission 
capacity away from retailers, at the same time it would permit all retailers to compete for 
large customers, and it would permit large customers to benefit from competition among 
retailers in ways they cannot do now.  The likely result of this is to reduce any economic rents 
accruing to retailers as a result of the capacity constraint, with a consequent benefit to large 
customers.  On balance, this seems less extreme than simply breaking all of the contracts 
between Vector and its shippers and would more closely match the limited interference in 
existing contracts with the problem and the potential benefits.  Letting existing large 
                                               
38  
See Figure 1: Net Gas Production by Field (PJ)  
39 The authors developed this recommendation independently from the Gas Industry Company which 
has proposed a similar, although perhaps more complex and interventionary, option.  “Retail 
Competition and Transmission Capacity Statement of Proposal:  Submissions Analysis and Next Steps, 
Gas Industry Company Limited, April 2011, available at 
http://www.gasindustry.co.nz/sites/default/files/u180/retail_competition_and_transmission_capacity_so
p_submissions_analysis_final_155240.9_1.pdf. Accessed June 2011. 
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customers take their capacity with them when they switch retailers will benefit existing large 
customers, but it will not make new capacity available to serve a new large customer.  Such a 
new customer can only be served if the pipeline capacity is expanded. 
 
Attempting to create a market for capacity on Vector’s pipeline will probably fail under 
current conditions because there is little or no incentive for any shipper holding capacity to 
sell it.   
 
Long Term 
 
In the long term, there may be an actual capacity constraint on the Vector pipeline system, in 
other words, demand from new customers such that the available capacity could not satisfy all 
the demand for pipeline transmission capacity.  In this case, the only long term solution is to 
increase Vector’s pipeline capacity either by boosting pressure or building a new 
pipeline.  Depending on where the additional demand would need to be accommodated, it 
might be worthwhile to focus on expanding capacity through Auckland, between 
approximately Papakura and the Henderson Compression Station, which is a section of the 
Vector pipeline that operates at a lower compression rate than the sections directly north and 
south of it.
40
 
 
Before undertaking any such pipeline capacity expansion, however, Vector and its regulators 
would need to be satisfied that there is enough actual incremental demand to justify such an 
investment.  The amount of incremental demand is also connected to potential customers and 
retailers’ understanding the availability of new gas supplies, as discussed previously. 
 
Addressing the long term capacity constraint will also solve, of course, any short-term 
capacity issues as well.  If it is understood that there is sufficient capacity on the Vector 
system, the incentive for shippers to hold excess capacity will be removed. 
 
  
                                               
40
  See Map 3: Northern New Zealand Transmission Pipelines. 
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Privatisation 
 
While a substantial privatisation of the gas industry took place in the 1990s, one important 
participant in the gas industry, Genesis, remains government owned.  Aside from losing 
whatever benefits privatisation might deliver, having state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
private companies operating side-by-side in the gas market causes problems.  SOEs fear that 
they will have constraints imposed on them by the government that make it difficult to 
compete in the market.  Privately-owned competitors fear that SOEs will get favourable 
interest rates and access to capital and other benefits only available to SOEs, resulting in 
private companies being reluctant to compete against a SOE.  In the end, both SOEs and their 
privately-owned competitors are leery of the arrangements, and this can inhibit the 
functioning of the market.   
 
There could be benefits from the partial privatisation of Genesis, but there would be 
more benefits from a full privatisation.  This would result from treating all companies the 
same and removing impediments to competition.  In its new budget proposed in May 2011, 
the government included a partial privatisation of Genesis.
41
  This would, apparently, be a 
privatisation of a minority share of the company.  Such a privatisation might bring benefits, 
primarily from the increased scrutiny of the company by the investment community, and the 
necessity of making its transactions and business relationships more transparent.  This could 
also result in more efficient operations.  Such a partial privatisation, however, would still 
leave the government with a controlling interest on Genesis’ Board and would not address the 
concerns of Genesis and its competitors regarding a SOE participating in the market with 
private companies.  While a partial privatisation is better than none, it is still not as good as a 
full privatisation. 
 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED) 
 
MED collects a great deal of useful information on the gas industry, but it would be helpful if 
The Ministry of Economic Development could provide greater analysis of the gas 
industry data to assist industry participants in understanding current conditions and 
future trends.  The Ministry could also play a greater role in developing and 
recommending policy for the gas industry.   
 
                                               
41
 NZHerald.co.nz, “Budget: SOE sell-off to raise $5-7b”, 19 May 2011. 
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Currently, MED seems to provide little if any analysis of the data that it collects.  The 
available data appear to be reasonably complete, but without some analysis and interpretation 
of the data, their usefulness is reduced, and they are subject to misuse by others who do not 
understand the assumptions behind the data and their limitations.  Furthermore, it is not until 
the data are subject to the rigors of analysis that any inconsistencies or errors may become 
apparent.  Finally, analysis of the data will assist MED is its policy planning function. 
 
Location of New Gas Generating Facilities 
 
While it is fairly obvious, given the gas pipeline transmission constraints and the current 
insufficient incentives for investment to increase that capacity, it makes sense to locate new 
gas-fired electricity generation facilities nearer to the gas fields such that they do not 
need to use the Vector transmission system.  Improvements to the electricity grid make it 
likely that such new generating plants could be accommodated more easily than Vector’s 
transmission system could handle the equivalent gas.  The exception to this would be if a new 
electricity generating facility on the Vector system were sufficient to call for the investment 
to expand the pipeline. 
 
Regulation and Investment Incentives 
 
Regarding Commerce Commission (the Commission) regulation of gas pipeline companies, it 
is important to make the point that the Commission has proposed forms of price regulation, 
either a weighted average price cap or a revenue cap,
42
 that are superior to, for example, rate-
base rate-of-return regulation in terms of the efficiency incentives and flexibility that they 
provide.  The Commerce Commission’s proposed general regulatory framework seems 
to conform to international best practices.   
 
There are a number of components to the regulations facing gas transmission and distribution 
companies, and each of these components potentially can have an effect on the risk and return 
from new pipeline investment.  If one component, such as the rate of return or the 
depreciation schedule, were perceived as unsatisfactory by potential investors, this might not 
be enough to derail new investments.  It seems to be the case, however, that gas industry 
participants express reservations about nearly every one of the regulatory components put in 
                                               
42 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011. The Commerce Commission’s Final Determination is due 29 February 2012 
and the initial default price-quality path is intended to be set on 1 July 2012. 
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place or proposed by the Commission to regulate gas pipeline companies.  Such 
disagreements between the regulator and the regulated companies are to be expected, of 
course, but even so the totality of the regulations and the incentives inherent in them call into 
question whether companies will be willing to invest in new pipeline facilities under the 
current and proposed regulatory rules.  Furthermore, some of the components of the 
regulations seem to increase the risk of investing without any offsetting benefit, and there is 
some question on the part of the regulated companies, as discussed below, as to whether the 
Commission will honour its part of the regulatory bargain.  The Commerce Commission 
should evaluate whether its package of current and proposed regulations is adequate to 
permit regulated companies to invest in new pipeline facilities. 
 
Certainty of the return of new investment 
 
Regulated companies expect with a reasonable certainty that they will be able to charge prices 
sufficient to permit them the return of their investment – in other words, that depreciation 
rates are adequate and depreciation can be recovered through prices.  The lumpy nature of 
pipeline investment – new investment will result in a relatively large increase in capacity – 
coupled with the weighted average price cap proposed for all of the pipeline companies other 
than Maui
43
 suggests that the risk of getting a return of any new investment may be 
significant. 
 
The Commission’s proposed weighted average price cap permits the weighted average of 
prices to increase with a measure of inflation, the CPI.
44
  Revenues can increase to the extent 
that the quantities sold at each price increase.  If new investment is undertaken, the investing 
company can increase total revenues within the regulatory period with increased sales within 
the weighted average price cap. This is noted by the Commission as an advantage of the 
weighted average price cap for Vector and distribution businesses with large networks 
considering incremental investment.
45
 However, the investing company would have to have 
quantities increase sufficiently to generate revenues sufficient to permit it to recover its 
investment.  With the case of lumpy pipeline investment, this might require quantity increases 
that are unreasonable to expect in the early years after the investment is made. Under a total 
revenue cap, alternatively, the investing company would be able to recover the costs of 
                                               
43 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraphs 4.12 and 4.42. 
44 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 4.7. 
45 Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 4.9. 
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investment when the regulatory asset base is adjusted to account for the new investment. Any 
increase in quantities sold following an investment would be compensated for by a decrease 
in prices in order to maintain revenues below the cap. 
 
If pipeline investment is considered to be necessary, some alternative to a weighted 
average price cap will be required to provide the incentive for companies to invest.  A 
revenue cap could be a solution to this problem, as prices would initially increase to levels 
sufficient to permit a return on and of the investment, and prices would decline over time as 
quantities increased so that the investing companies’ revenues remained below the revenue 
cap.  The revenue cap itself would increase to adjust for the investment in new capacity, and 
then it could change over time – for instance, the Commission has proposed that Maui’s 
revenue cap increase with inflation, measured by the CPI.
46
  Ironically, the Commission has 
proposed a revenue cap for Maui precisely because it does not anticipate Maui making 
significant investments and weighted average price caps for the other pipeline companies that 
might be making significant investments.
47
 This may be backwards. 
 
The Commission has proposed to adjust the weighted average price caps and revenue cap by 
the CPI.  The measure of inflation used to adjust the price cap should be as closely related as 
possible to the cost changes that are faced by the regulated company.  Using the CPI may not 
reflect cost changes for a capital-intensive industry such as a pipeline.  Certainly, the CPI is a 
questionable inflation measure for the annual adjustments to the asset values that are part of 
the Commission’s proposal.  Using the CPI for these adjustments introduces additional risk 
for the regulated companies and would necessitate a higher rate of return to compensate for 
this risk.  The Commerce Commission should consider using a measure of inflation in its 
weighted average price cap and revenue cap methodologies that better reflects the costs 
confronted by the regulated companies and the change in the replacement cost of their 
assets. 
 
  
                                               
46  Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 4.5. 
47  Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 4.39. 
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There is a related issue in that annual increases in asset values as a result of an increase in the 
CPI are treated as income.  This creates profits without off-setting cash flow.  Based on this 
proposed regulation and other approved and proposed regulations, the Commerce 
Commission needs to recognize the effect of this lack of cash flow on the pipeline 
companies and consider whether they will have adequate cash flow to maintain the 
credit rating that is assumed in determining the allowed rate of return. 
 
Customised price-quality paths 
 
The Commission is proposing customised price-quality paths (CPP) to address the problem of 
recovering lumpy investments.  Under the proposed CPP, upon approval of the new 
investment, the default price-quality path (DPP) would be modified to a CPP with conditions 
that are more appropriate for the firm’s particular circumstances.48 
 
There are shortcomings to this approach that may prevent the possibility of a CPP from 
having the effect on investment anticipated by the Commission.  Once a company applies to 
the Commission for a CPP, it loses the option of reverting to the DPP and cancelling the 
investment if the company were to determine that the approved CPP were inadequate.
49
  This 
is a problem to the extent that regulated companies are not confident that the Commission will 
confine its review for the CPP only to the proposed new investment but will reconsider all of 
the company’s investments and expenses. If the Commission sets less favourable conditions 
under the CPP than under the DPP, they may also apply claw back on earlier revenues.
50
 In 
addition, any CPP may only apply for a maximum of five years, after which time a 
reapplication must be made or the company must revert to the DPP.
51
 These conditions 
introduce an element of risk for the regulated companies and may prevent them from 
undertaking new investments.  Overall, the implementation of the CPP does not appear to be 
good regulatory policy, at least insofar as its potential effect on investment.  The Commerce 
Commission should consider offering companies the possibility of reverting to the 
default price-quality path after they apply for a customised price path, and the 
Commission should consider reaffirming exactly what would be considered in the 
analysis leading to the possible establishment of a customised price-quality path. 
 
                                               
48  Commerce Commission, “Discussion Paper: Initial Default Price-Quality Path for Gas Pipeline 
Businesses”, 1 April 2011, paragraph 2.11. 
49 Commerce Act 1986 No 5 (as at 01 November 2010), Public Act. Part 4 Section 53R. 
50 Commerce Act 1986 No 5 (as at 01 November 2010), Public Act. Part 4 Section 53V (2)(b). 
51
 Commerce Act 1986 No 5 (as at 01 November 2010), Public Act. Part 4 Section 53W. 
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There is a problem unique to Vector even if a CPP were to be approved by the Commission.  
Vector uses the Vector Transmission Contract (VTC) with its shippers.  This is a negotiated 
contract that sets the price for using the Vector pipeline.  Vector cannot unilaterally increase 
its prices under this contract.  If it did, the shippers could refuse to pay, and there would no 
longer be an enforceable contract in effect.  Vector’s recourse at this point would be to cut off 
the shippers, which is probably politically impossible, as cutting off gas to electricity 
generating stations or residential customers would not be acceptable.  Under current 
regulations, the Commission would not impose new, higher prices on Vector’s shippers, so 
even having a CPP approved by the Commission would not permit Vector to increase prices 
to generate sufficient revenues to recover its investment. 
 
Given the lumpy pipeline investment, it may be impractical to expect a pipeline company 
such as Vector to accept the risk that quantities might rise quickly enough to permit it to 
recover its investment under either the DPP or a CPP, given that Vector cannot in practice 
increase prices to its shippers.  If new pipeline investment is required, some form of 
revenue cap, such as is proposed for Maui, with enforceable prices, might be required 
for Vector to be able to invest.  This would entail a regulatory change to the VTC such that 
prices could be increased for current shippers to a level expected to generate sufficient 
revenues.  Over time, as quantities increased, the prices would decline.   
 
Another possibility is that a new power plant to be served by the Vector pipeline could be 
responsible for purchasing enough of the new pipeline capacity that it would be possible for 
Vector to build it under the proposed DPP regulation.  If the quantity of capacity purchased 
increased sufficiently as a result of the new power plant, the quantity risk that Vector would 
face from the new pipeline investment would be manageable.  In addition to an electricity 
generator knowing that there would be pipeline capacity available, it also relates to the issue 
of the availability of gas supplies and the different views held by producers as opposed to 
retailers and customers.   
 
Asset values 
 
One component of the DPP is the valuation of the regulated company’s assets.  The price cap 
or revenue cap is initialised using asset values for the company and an approved rate of return 
to determine the revenues that are required to provide the permitted return on assets.  When 
pipelines were initially regulated, the Commission determined in 2000 the asset values that it 
would use.  This was not the result of a comprehensive regulatory review but, rather, appears 
36 
 
to be a valuation put in place quickly so that the Commission could determine how to move 
forward.  Subsequently, the Commission undertook a two-year review, with the participation 
of all parties, of the methodology it should use to value pipeline assets, and these valuations 
were determined in 2005.  The resulting valuation methodology conformed to international 
standards. 
 
For reasons that are not entirely clear but apparently have to do with the fact that the 2005 
valuations were higher than the 2000 valuations, the Commission rejected the use of its 2005 
valuations, which were the result of a long and comprehensive review, and reverted to the 
lower valuations from 2000, which had not benefited from such a review.  There are two 
consequences to this action.  First, to the extent that the 2000 valuations are lower than is 
justified by the methodology resulting from the review, it makes the current return on 
investment less attractive and, consequently, acts as an impediment to new investment which 
might be similarly undervalued.  Second, it affects the credibility of the Commission because 
the Commission did not stand by the results of its own analysis.  The Commerce 
Commission should, therefore, consider valuing pipeline assets using the methodology 
that led to the 2005 valuations. 
 
Rate of return 
 
The rate of return is used along with the asset value to initialize the DPP and any CPP.  While 
the rate of return is determined based on past or current credit market conditions, it will 
presumably be used for new investments at least until such time as another rate of return 
study is undertaken.  Parties might reasonably expect, however, that any new study to reflect 
changed credit market conditions might follow the same methodology. 
 
The Commission recognises that the risks of setting the allowed rate of return are not 
symmetrical, that the risks of setting the rate too low are greater than the risks of setting the 
rate too high.  Consequently, the Commission uses various methodologies and determines a 
midpoint of the rate of return calculations.  Recognising the asymmetric risks, however, the 
Commission determined that it would use the 75
th
 percentile rate of return for the purposes of 
initialising its DPPs for each regulated pipeline company.
52
  While this is commendable and 
seeks to avoid setting a rate of return that is too low, some regulated parties view the allowed 
rate of return, even at the 75
th
 percentile, as too low.   
                                               
52  Commerce Commission, “Decision Number 718: Determination of the Cost of Capital for Services 
Regulated under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986”, 3 March 2011, Paragraphs 24, 37. 
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There are other concerns about matching the term of the risk-free assets used in the rate of 
return calculations to the economic life of pipeline investments.  Using a shorter-term, which 
generally carries a lower interest rate, does not match well with the longer-term lives of the 
assets.  Some parties also have more technical concerns as to the manner in which the 
weighted average cost of capital was determined. 
 
Regulated companies can, of course, be expected to object to any such determinations by the 
regulator.  Nevertheless, because there is concern around a number of components of the 
regulatory framework for the pipeline companies, the Commerce Commission should 
reconsider its rate of return determinations to be certain that the allowed rate of return 
is sufficient to permit the regulated pipeline companies to attract new capital.  
 
Complexity of the proposed default price-quality path plan 
 
There is some evidence that the proposed default price-quality regulatory plan is too complex.  
This is evident from the fact that not all the parties have the same understanding of what the 
plan actually is.  The plan is also difficult to explain in detail. 
 
The proposed plan also may be unduly risky.  Most price regulation plans make annual 
adjustments to the price cap (or revenue cap in the case of revenue plans) based on a pre-
determined productivity adjustment and actual inflation.  The Commission has determined 
that the productivity adjustment, or X, should be zero, and, therefore, the price or revenue cap 
would change each year with inflation, measured by the CPI.  Instead of making these annual 
adjustments based on actual inflation, however, the Commission is proposing to make the 
adjustments based on a forecast of inflation for the five years.  This appears to introduce 
additional risk for the regulated companies – risk that inflation might be greater than the 
forecast – without any offsetting benefit to the regulated companies.  As a result of this 
example, and perhaps other aspects of the proposed regulation, the Commerce Commission 
should consider simplifying the proposed default price-quality path methodology and 
taking steps to reduce the risk inherent in the regulations. 
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Regulatory Treatment of Companies that are Sold 
 
Regulatory treatment of companies that are sold is not the same as for companies that are not 
sold.  In other words, rates permitted for a company that has never been sold will most likely 
be different, and probably higher, than rates for a comparable company that has been sold.  
This seems to be a horizontal equity issue both for customers and for investors. 
 
This asymmetry comes about in the instance, for example, that a company is acquired at a 
price that values the assets of the company being acquired at more than the value of the assets 
for regulation.  The higher tax base generates more depreciation and hence a lower corporate 
tax.  This lower corporate tax is a lower expense, for regulatory purposes, than for the 
company that was not sold.  The company that was not sold has a lower depreciation 
deduction and a larger corporate tax that is an expense in the regulatory context.  Using the 
regulatory asset base results in a revenue requirement and rates that are higher for the 
company that was never sold than for the company that was sold.  The Commerce 
Commission should consider eliminating the asymmetric treatment of rates and 
revenues when regulated companies are sold and the purchased asset values are 
different from the regulated asset values by using the regulatory asset base, 
depreciation, and tax liability for the company that was sold. 
 
Commerce Commission Credibility 
 
Fundamental to regulating a company such as a pipeline company is the concept of the 
regulatory bargain.  Under the regulatory bargain, the company is subject to economic 
regulation, but the regulator promises the company a return adequate to provide a market rate 
of compensation to its shareholders, to permit a return of its investment, and to attract new 
capital.  For this to work, the regulated companies must be confident that the regulator will 
honour its side of the bargain.   
 
Because of past and proposed actions, a number of industry participants are not confident that 
the Commission will keep its part of the regulatory bargain.  Some of these contributing 
factors are the valuation of the asset base for regulation, the determination of the rate of 
return, the mechanics of the proposed DPP, and the determination of a CPP.  This uncertainty 
simply serves to increase risk for current and potential investors.  It is also a problem because 
the Commission proposes an initial default price-quality path plan with five years duration.  
Investments in the gas transmission business, of course, have an economic life much longer 
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than that.  Companies are concerned as to what the Commission might do at the end of the 
five year period and if there will be a claw back of any efficiency gains that have been 
realised as a result of the incentives in place under the default price-quality path regulation.  
There are advantages to a default price-quality path regulation with no fixed term, although a 
five year term might be required under the current circumstances in New Zealand where there 
is less experience with this type or regulation in the gas industry.  As a result, the Commerce 
Commission should consider steps to bolster the industry’s perception that it will 
honour its side of the regulatory bargain before, during and at the end of the term of the 
price regulation. 
 
A Spot Market and Gas Storage 
 
There does not seem to be any prospect or need for a spot market for gas in New 
Zealand.  The market is rather small to support one, and many of the functions that buyers 
and sellers would get from a spot market seem to be provided by flexible long term gas 
purchase contracts and the ability of the Maui pipeline to handle some overage and underage 
through line packing.  The Gas Industry Company’s attempt to establish a spot market was 
not successful.  There was some criticism that the attempted spot market mechanism was too 
complex, and that a simpler one might have worked, but on balance such success does not 
seem likely. 
 
The prospects for gas storage in New Zealand are limited.  Contact Energy’s gas storage 
investment is driven by its take-or-pay contract.  Otherwise, there do not seem to be facilities 
available for storage, and the low seasonal price variations make storage less attractive than it 
is in other countries where seasonal price variations may be greater.  The low seasonal price 
variation also makes interruptible gas contracts less desirable for large customers, as they 
cannot save enough money to justify dealing with an interruptible gas supply. 
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IV.   Summary 
 
The gas industry in New Zealand is presently facing a number of challenges. The main barrier 
facing market participants is a lack of pipeline transmission capacity in and north of 
Auckland. This lack of capacity is preventing new industrial customers from using gas and 
preventing competition among retailers for existing large customers. The authors are hopeful 
that the following policy recommendations will prove useful for policy makers and the two 
industry regulators. 
 
1. The Ministry of Economic Development should consider its total package of gas 
exploration incentives at such time as the Ministry determines that finding new gas 
reserves is a priority. 
 
2. The Gas Industry Company could facilitate the communication of information to all 
parties, including industry supply conditions and pipeline capacity availability. 
 
3. A short-term solution to the Vector pipeline capacity problem is to let large customers 
(this would need to be defined) take their Vector transmission capacity with them 
when they switch retailers. 
 
4. The only long term solution is to increase Vector’s pipeline capacity either by 
boosting pressure or building a new pipeline. 
 
5. There could be benefits from the partial privatisation of Genesis, but there would be 
more benefits from a full privatisation. 
 
6. The Ministry of Economic Development could provide greater analysis of the gas 
industry data to assist industry participants in understanding current conditions and 
future trends.  The Ministry could also play a greater role in developing and 
recommending policy for the gas industry. 
 
7. Electricity generators are expected to locate new gas-fired electricity generation 
facilities nearer to the gas fields such that they do not need to use the Vector 
transmission system. 
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8. The Commerce Commission’s proposed general regulatory framework seems to 
conform to international best practices. 
 
9. The Commerce Commission should evaluate whether its package of current and 
proposed regulations is adequate to permit regulated companies to invest in new 
pipeline facilities. 
 
10. If pipeline investment is considered to be necessary, some alternative to a weighted 
average price cap will be required to provide the incentive for companies to invest.  A 
revenue cap could be a solution to this problem. 
 
11. The Commerce Commission should consider using a measure of inflation in its 
weighted average price cap and revenue cap methodologies that better reflects the 
costs confronted by the regulated companies and the change in the replacement cost 
of their assets. 
 
12. The Commerce Commission needs to consider whether pipeline companies will have 
adequate cash flow to maintain the credit rating that is assumed in determining the 
allowed rate of return. 
 
13. The Commerce Commission should consider offering companies the possibility of 
reverting to the default price-quality path after they apply for a customised price path.  
 
14. The Commerce Commission should consider reaffirming exactly what would be 
considered in the analysis leading to the possible establishment of a customised price-
quality path. 
 
15. If new pipeline investment is required, some form of revenue cap, such as is proposed 
for Maui, with enforceable prices, might be required for Vector to be able to invest. 
 
16. The Commerce Commission should consider valuing pipeline assets using the 
methodology that led to the 2005 valuations. 
 
17. The Commerce Commission should reconsider its rate of return determinations to be 
certain that the allowed rate of return is sufficient to permit the regulated pipeline 
companies to attract new capital. 
 
42 
 
18. The Commerce Commission should consider simplifying the proposed default price-
quality path methodology and taking steps to reduce the risk inherent in the 
regulations. 
 
19. The Commerce Commission should consider eliminating the asymmetric treatment of 
rates and revenues when regulated companies are sold and the purchased asset values 
are different from the regulated asset values by using the regulatory asset base, 
depreciation, and tax liability for the company that was sold. 
 
20. The Commerce Commission should consider steps to bolster the industry’s 
perception that it will honour its side of the regulatory bargain before, during and at 
the end of the term of the price regulation. 
 
21. There does not seem to be any prospect or need for a spot market for gas in New 
Zealand.   
 
22. The prospects for gas storage in New Zealand are limited. 
